The somatic pathophysiology of high spinal cord injury (SCI) not only is of interest in itself but also sheds light on one of the several rationales proposed for equating`brain death' (BD) with death, namely that the brain confers integrative unity upon the body, which would otherwise constitute a mere conglomeration of cells and tissues. Insofar as the neuropathology of BD includes infarction down to the foramen magnum, the somatic pathophysiology of BD should resemble that of cervico-medullary junction transection plus vagotomy. The endocrinologic aspects can be made comparable either by focusing on BD patients without diabetes insipidus or by supposing the victim of high SCI to have pre-existing therapeutically compensated diabetes insipidus. The respective literatures on intensive care for BD organ donors and high SCI corroborate that the two conditions are somatically virtually identical. If SCI victims are alive at the level of the`organism as a whole', then so must be BD patients (the only signi®cant dierence being consciousness). Comparison with SCI leads to the conclusion that if BD is to be equated with death, a more coherent reason must be adduced than that the body as a biological organism is dead.
Introduction
Spinal shock is a transient functional depression of the structurally intact cord below a lesion, following acute spinal cord injury (SCI). It does not occur with slowly progressive lesions but requires a suddenness of cessation of rostral in¯uences. Its pathophysiology remains poorly understood. The hypo-or nonfunction typically lasts 2 ± 6 weeks, followed by recovery of autonomous, disinhibited functions.
The phenomenon is of interest not only in itself and for its eects on SCI victims and their clinical management. It also carries surprising theoretical implications for a clinically quite unrelated entity, namely`brain death' (BD): speci®cally, implications for the rationale for equating BD with death.
(Together with Veatch, 1 I prefer to place`brain death' in quotation marks on account of its semantic ambiguity.
2 ) The various proposed rationales can be subdivided into three main categories, corresponding to three fundamentally dierent concepts of death: (1) sociological (death is loss of conferred membership in society; its legal de®nition is culturally relative, and most modern societies happen to have chosen to recognize brain-based diagnoses); (2) psychological (death is loss of personhood due to loss of potential for all mental functions, and the brain is the organ of the mind); or (3) biological (death is loss of physiological, anti-entropic unity of an organism, and the brain is the hierarchically highest integrating organ of the body).
It is to this last category of rationale (and to it only) that the phenomenon of spinal shock is conceptually relevant. It is also historically and politically the most important of the three, being what could be called the standard, quasi-ocial, or`orthodox' rationale. The idea that BD is death because the brain is the body's central integrator or`critical organ', destruction of which entails loss of somatic integrative unity (cessation of the`organism as a whole'), has been endorsed by a variety of in¯uential individuals and virtually every standard-setting group that has ventured to explicitly articulate a rationale. 5 ± 12 (For all practical purposes relevant to somatic pathophysiology,`destruction' 3, 4 is taken as equivalent to`total brain infarction' 5 and`irreversible nonfunction. 6 ) (This is not to say that they do not consider consciousness important in itself and also a sign of life. It is simply that for them consciousness is not the decisive factor in determining human death. Rather, what is conceptually pivotal is the vital status of the body as a biological organism: if the body is alive, then the person is alive even if permanently unconscious; if the body (including the brain) is dead, then so is the person). (Thought experiments of isolated living brains are best conceived as involving severely mutilated living bodies, of which all that remains is the brain.) Insofar as the`physiological kernel' of BD is the brain stem, 13 the same rationale has been advanced also by advocates of brain-stem formulations of death 14, 15 (for a fuller discussion and critique of which, see 2, 16 ). A traditionally cited manifestation of the somatic dis-integration' of BD is hemodynamic deterioration and loss of homeostasis, intractably spiraling to imminent and irreversible asystole, 6,7,11,13,15,17 ± 19 although such outcome is not universal or intrinsically necessary. 20 Still, whether BD is conceived as total brain infarction', 5 `i rreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain' 6 or`permanent functional death of the brainstem' 21 it clearly eliminates multiple neural centers involved in somatic integration.
A rarely entertained alternative explanation, however, for the somatic pathophysiology of BD is spinal shock from sudden cessation of rostral in¯uences, as ®rst suggested by Ibe back in 1971:
The clinical picture was in all cases marked by continuous loss of consciousness and persisting respiratory paralysis. The brain function was constantly extinguished. The primary spinal areflexia, on the other hand, as well as the disorders of pulse and blood pressure after overcoming the spinal shock (about 24 ± 36 h after the accident), showed a clear tendency to recovery, possibly to complete restitution.' 22 The idea was hardly noticed, appearing in an EEG abstract, with the phrase`spinal shock' mentioned only in passing.
Later Youngner and Bartlett, critiquing the physiological rationale for`whole-brain death', alluded to certain other somatic similarities between BD and high cervical cord transection: a spinal cord transection at the level of the second cervical vertebrae [sic] . . . leads to the immediate and irreversible loss of spontaneous respiration, cardiovascular stability, and temperature control ± all of which are integrating functions.' 23 Again the potential signi®cance of the comparison was largely overlooked.
Could it be that high cord transection and BD are somatically similar with respect not only to these functions but to others as well? The answer is highly relevant to the question of somatic integrative unity in BD, ie, to the distinction between a sick, disabled organism and a non-organism. Bernat, in his defense of BD against recent critiques, alludes to the abovementioned similarities with spinal cord dysfunction but dismisses their relevance in the following way:
Scholars have pointed out correctly that the spinal cord performs a number of integrative functions for the organism, and that it seems arbitrary and contrived for the whole brain proponents to emphasize the brain's role in integration to the exclusion of that of the spinal cord. While it is true that as part of the central nervous system, the spinal cord has an integrating role, it is not a critical role. For example, many patients have lived long lives with minimal support following complete destruction of the spinal cord by injury or disease. Therefore, the integrating functions served by the spinal cord clearly are not necessary for life and therefore, their absence is not necessary (and certainly not sucient) for death. Permanent cessation of the clinical functions of the entire brain, therefore, remains the best criterion of death.' 9 The logic behind the word`therefore' in that last sentence is unclear. The point of the critics' comparison is not that cord function is necessary for biological life (understood at the level of the`organism as a whole'), but rather that, precisely because it isn't, yet BD and high cord transection have similar somatic eects, then it logically follows that neither is brain function necessary for biological life (equally at the level of the`organism as a whole'). The key issue is the extent to which the two conditions are really somatically physiologically similar.
The best way to assess this comparison objectively is to consult relevant clinical literature that has neither the comparison in mind nor any philosophical point to make about the nature of BD, ie, texts on the intensive care of BD and high SCI by specialists with extensive experience in the respective conditions.
To forestall potential misunderstanding, let it be reemphasized that the purpose of this comparison is not to advance a claim that BD is clinically indistinguishable from SCI, which would be absurd. Nor is the issue to which the comparison is relevant the clinical criteria for diagnosing a dead brain (the validity of which is taken for granted for purposes of this paper), but rather one particular conceptual rationale (among several) for equating a dead brain with a dead individual: namely the one that claims that a dead brain equates with a dead body. A quite dierent rationale, promoted by advocates of`higher brain' formulations, maintains that the reason why BD is death is that irreversible unconsciousness constitutes a loss of personhood, regardless of the vital status of the body as a biological organism. 1,23 ± 28 Plainly, for this rationale the role of consciousness is critical and any physiological comparison with SCI is irrelevant.
The interest of the comparison, therefore, has to do with its implications for the conceptual validity of the biological rationale only ± and that interest is heightened by the fact that that rationale happens to be the mainstream or quasi-ocial one almost everywhere. Thus, the ignoring of consciousness in what follows is in no way intended to belittle the obviously exceeding value of intact consciousness and communicative abilities, which SCI patients enjoy and BD patients lack. Subjective consciousness is simply not the main focus of the`orthodox' rationale, so it is equally beside the point for the present critique of that rationale.
Method
The contemporary neuroanesthesia and neuro-intensive care literatures relating to high SCI and BD were compared, focusing on somatic pathophysiology, symptomatology, treatment, and survival. To compare long-term outcomes with continued aggressive treatment, reliance was made on a compilation of some 175 BD cases with prolonged survival, 
Results

Similarities
The extensive somatic parallels between high SCI and BD, according to the literature, are as follows (outline structure summarized in Table 1 ).
I.
Induction phase of neurologic lesion In both conditions, associated multisystem damage is common and could account for somatic deterioration independently of the neurologic nonfunction. I.A. Direct multisystem damage The primary etiologies of SCI and BD sometimes directly damage non-neural organs as well: for example, massive trauma. 29 The early mortality rate in SCI is increased with associated injuries compared to pure cord injury. 30, 31 Similarly, the rate of early asystole in BD is increased with associated injuries compared to pure brain injury. 20 I.B. Indirect systemic complications During induction of experimental cervical cord transection, transient hypertension occurs, probably from massive depolarization of sympathetic preganglionic neurons. 32 In clinical experience this is not usually observed, presumably because it has already resolved by the time medical assistance arrives. 32 Analogously, during the process of brain herniation, prior to BD, transient hypertension is common, also due to massive sympathetic hyperactivity and release of circulating catecholamines. 18, 33, 34 This sympathetic storm can produce subendocardial ischemia or neurogenic pulmonary edema in acute SCI 31, 32, 35 as well as in severe brain injury. 18,33,34,36 ± 41 The cardiac pathology associated with experimental BD can be prevented by prior sympathectomy and verapamil, con®rming the causal role of sympathetic hyperactivity. 42 
II.
Acute phase The non-endocrinologic manifestations of the acute phase are nearly identical in high SCI and BD. II.A. Irreversible apnea is a hallmark of both cord transection above C4 32, 35, 43 and BD. II.B. Quadriplegia characterizes both high cord transection, 32, 43 and BD. II.C. Spinal shock Immediately upon severe SCI, the intact cord below the lesion functionally shuts down through poorly understood mechanisms. This spinal shock typically lasts 2 ± 6 weeks, after which autonomous cord functions gradually return. 32, 35, 44 Its intensity increases with the height of the lesion. 32, 35, 45 Insofar as BD is, from the cord's perspective, a transection at the cervico-medullary junction, one should expect maximal spinal shock in BD. Indeed, in both high cervical transection and BD both`somatic' and autonomic spinal functions are suppressed as follows. (The semantic tradition distinguishing`somatic' from`autonomic' nervous systems is unfortunate, especially for the present purpose, implying that the autonomic system has nothing to do with the body; ironically, the autonomic system is perhaps more important for somatic unity than the`somatic' system.) II.C.1.`Somatic' system deactivation Flaccidity and absence of tendon re¯exes and of plantar responses characterize acute SCI. 45 Although¯accidity is not a diagnostic requirement for BD, it is so common that positive muscle tone should at least raise the question of decorticate or decerebrate rigidity, which would exclude the diagnosis. Likewise, are¯exia is so common in BD that the original Harvard Committee considered it a diagnostic feature (though not absolutely required) along with absent plantar responses. (Subsequent BD criteria emphasized the diagnostic compatibility of preserved tendon re¯exes without denying that are¯exia is nevertheless more characteristic. 6 49 and can be of life-threatening severity. 31, 32, 35, 50 Hypotension is also very common in BD. 18, 20 (Table 1) 45 and BD. 33, 34, 51 The high rate of early cardiac arrest in both conditions is partly iatrogenic, due to inability of the compromised heart to accommodate overly aggressive¯uid resuscitation, leading to pulmonary edema and congestive heart failure in less than expert hands. 17 II.C.3. Hypothermia and poikilothermia are common in SCI, due to cutaneous vasodilation (from sympathetic paralysis) causing increased heat loss, plus physical inactivity and inability to shiver (from skeletal muscle paralysis) causing decreased heat generation. 31, 32, 35, 50, 57 For identical reasons, hypothermia and poikilothermia also occur in up to 86% of BD patients. 18, 33, 34, 51 Hypothermia exacerbates cardiovascular instability in both conditions, requiring heating lamps and multiple blankets.
Hyperthermia can result from high ambient temperature or high humidity, compounded by absent sympathetic control of sweating, in both SCI 31, 32, 35, 50, 57 and BD. 20 
II.E. Predisposition to infection In both conditions
immobility and lack of coughing and sighing promote pneumonia and diminish antibiotic ecacy.
20 (Table 1) , 35, 57 Bladder dysfunction promotes urinary tract infection, 20 (Table 1),32 and immobility predisposes to decubitus ulcers with local infection and risk of sepsis. Preventive nursing care is identical for both conditions. II.F. Actuarial survival curves II.F.1. High cervical quadriplegia has a biphasic survival curve, with rapid drop-o in the ®rst three months (especially the ®rst). In one study 3-month survival was only 43%. 80 The subsequent chronic phase has a relatively low death rate.
80±82
Survival curves for BD treated equally aggressively also feature a rapid drop-o over the ®rst several months (especially the ®rst), followed by a chronic phase of relative stabilization. Exactly the same occurs in chronic BD; prior to 4 weeks the most frequent terminal event is spontaneous asystole, whereas after 4 weeks it is treatment withdrawal. 20 
III.A.2.b
In SCI bradycardia and bradyarrhythmias completely resolve by 2 ± 6 weeks. 49, 55 Similarly, in prolonged BD cardiac rhythm also stabilizes. 20 (Table 1) III.A.2.c In SCI gastrointestinal motility returns and enteral feedings can resume. 35, 57 The same is true in some prolonged BD cases (through the intrinsic neurenteric plexus and intraspinal autonomic integration), 20 ( Table 1) although lack of swallowing requires providing enteral feedings by tube, in contrast to SCI.
III.A.2.d
In SCI piloerection and sweating gradually return. 32 Parallel data for chronic BD are lacking in the literature, although in one patient whom the author personally examined (`TK') these functions did return. 20 45 Re¯ex hypertensive responses to surgical incision in unanesthetized BD organ donors are similar (apart from heart rate ± see below) yet occur much earlier than the several weeks typically required for development of autonimic dysre¯exia following SCI.
18,83 ± 89 The timing may not represent a real point of dierence, however. Little is known about the hemodyanmic response to unanesthetized surgery in acute SCI, since anesthesia is typically employed. Perhaps splitting the entire thorax and abdomen is a stimulus powerful enough to overcome any spinal shock.
Less is known about autonomic dysre¯exia in chronic BD, but some case reports do mention episodes of hypertension after a latency of several weeks.
20 (Table 1) Patient`TK' during the author's examination developed transient blotchy erythema of the face, neck and shoulders in response to noxious stimuli such as pinching or ice-water trickling down the neck. Nurses have documented that such reaction is characteristically associated with a transient rise in blood pressure and heart rate.
Dierences
The extensiveness of somatic parallels between SCI and BD contrasts markedly with the relative paucity and unimportance of the dierences, as follows (outline structure summarized in Table 2 ).
I.
Hypothalamic-posterior pituitary function is intact in SCI and variable in BD. Diabetes insipidus occurs in 38 ± 87% of BD patients. 18,33,59 ± 62,90 The inconsistency presumably stems from vicissitudes of vascular supply from the same extradural collaterals responsible for preserving anterior pituitary functions (see above). If inadequately treated, the ensuing hypovolemia and electrolyte imbalance will exacerbate the already tenuous cardiovascular status. Diabetes insipidus can appear after a brief latency following BD, and in some chronic cases (eg, TK') it can also gradually resolve. 91, 92 The bradycardia of high SCI is even more profound due to unopposed parasympathetic tone, 31, 32, 35, 55 and severe re¯ex bradycardia can be precipitated by vagal stimulation such as intubation, oropharyngeal suctioning, ocular pressure, or a sigh. 35 Such disadvantageous reactions do not occur in BD. Atropine can treat and prevent severe bradycardia in SCI 45 but has no chronotropic eect in BD because vagal function is already absent. 33 The bradycardia associated with autonomic hyperre¯exia in chronic SCI is vagally mediated. 32, 35, 45, 50 By contrast, the hypertension upon unanesthetized organ retrieval in BD (or upon somatic irritation in chronic BD) is associated with tachycardia, presumably mediated by unopposed spinal sympathetic reexes, including adrenally released circulating catecholamines. 18 32, 45 whereas in BD without diabetes insipidus they do not.
III. Glossopharyngeal nerve function is intact in SCI
and absent in BD. Together with vagal aerents, a branch of the ninth cranial nerve to the carotid body conveys additional baroreceptor information, all processed together and ultimately in¯uencing homeostasis as just described. 93 The somatic dierences between SCI and BD attributable to glossopharyngeal function are therefore the same as those attributable to vagal aerents, are relatively minor, and are nonexistent in the context of diabetes insipidus.
IV. Associated systemic complications Disseminated intravascular coagulation complicates 25 ± 65% of BD organ donors. 18, 51 It is not described in the spinal cord literature, presumably because much less tissue thromboplastin is released by SCI than by massive brain injury.
These, then, are the somatic dierences. Note that other cranial nerve functions and especially consciousness, though preserved in SCI and absent in BD, are not listed, because important as they are for the patient, they are unrelated Table 2 Somatic pathophysiological dierences between high cervical cord transection and BD
I.
Hypothalamic-posterior pituitary function (diabetes insipidus in 38 ± 87% of BD, absent in SCI) II. Vagus nerve functions (intact in SCI, absent in BD) A. Eerent functions 1. Bradycardia (more severe in SCI due to unopposed vagal tone; a hemodynamic disadvantage compared with BD) 2. Recovery of gastrointestinal motility following spinal shock seems less common in BD than in SCI B. Aerent function (intact in SCI, absent in BD) ± irrelevant if BD involves diabetes insipidus III. Glossopharyngeal nerve function (intact in SCI, absent in BD) ± irrelevant if BD involves diabetes insipidus IV. Associated systemic complications ± disseminated intravascular coagulation in 25 ± 65% of BD, much less in SCI to the focus of the comparison, namely somatic pathophysiology insofar as it is relevant to the question whether the body in either condition is a sick organism or a mere collection of organs.
Discussion
The similarity of eects of SCI and BD on the body is surprising at ®rst sight and fascinating in itself, but its relevance to one of the several rationales advanced to explain why BD should be equated with death elevates the comparison from a mere physiological curiosity to a conceptually important observation. According to the mainstream,`orthodox' rationale, the purported loss of somatic integrative unity in BD is attributable to destruction of the many brain-stem and hypothalamic integrative centers. 5 ± 8,11,12,15 But is it their destruction per se or rather the body's nonreception of their in¯uence that most immediately aects somatic integration? Surely the latter, because it is more proximate to the phenomenon of interest, it is the means through which the former exerts its eect, and it can also be brought about by other possible causes such as mere disconnection from cephalic structures. That the impact on somatic physiology of nonreception of rostral in¯uence should be indierent to the reason for the nonreception implies that body A with a destroyed brain and body B with a disconnected brain (eg, due to high SCI) should have the same vital status. Logical consistency demands that if we assert that A is dead as a biological organism, we must be prepared to say the same of B; but if we insist that B is clearly alive as a biological organism (and not merely because it is conscious), then we must be willing to admit the same of A.
Somatic equivalence in theory
The anatomical pathways through which somatically integrative information is transferred between body and brain are relatively few. In the aerent direction the routes are threefold:
. spinal cord . glossopharyngeal and vagus nerves (from the atrial, aortic and carotid baroreceptors), and . arterial blood¯ow to the hypothalamus (especially to supraoptic and paraventricular nuclei).
In the eerent direction the routes are likewise threefold:
. spinal cord, . vagus nerve, and . pituitary.
The other ten cranial nerves terminate in the head or neck and are irrelevant to somatic integration. Also note that the second and third aerent pathways are relevant only in contexts where the corresponding eerent limbs are intact. Blood¯ow to and from the brain in general is conceivably an additional pathway, though not for all practical purposes. Certainly extra-hypothalamic brain has receptors for various hormones and circulating chemicals, but those even remotely relevant to somatic integrative unity involve the hypothalamicpituitary axis. The brain is not known to be a secretory organ (apart from the portal system of the adenohypophysis). Similarly, the production, circulation, and venous absorption of cerebrospinal¯uid could be another theoretically conceivable route for brain-body chemical interaction, but there is no evidence that such exchange serves any somatically integrating role.
Plainly disruption of any one of the signi®cant pathways of encephalo-somatic communication does not destroy the unity of the`organism as a whole'. Every endocrinology clinic has patients with diabetes insipidus or even panhypopituitarism who live perfectly normal lives on replacement therapy. Every major rehabilitation center cares for ventilatordependent patients with high cervical quadriplegia. Sometimes for therapeutic reasons the vagus nerve is ablated surgically or pharmacologically.
What about elimination of two of these three routes? For example, suppose that a high cervical quadriplegic were given atropine to treat bradycardia. The somatic physiology of such a patient would be virtually identical to that of a BD patient without diabetes insipidus (the only dierence being preserved carotid-body modulation of antidiuretic hormone in the SCI patient).
To complete the analogy, suppose that the atropinized SCI victim was an endocrinology patient with chronic panhypopituitarism, stable on replacement therapy. The somatic physiology relevant to integrative unity is now absolutely identical to that of total brain infarction. The only dierence lies in consciousness and those cranial nerves restricted to head and neck. Is such a body an implacably disintegrating`collection of organs', or a livè organism as a whole' that happens to be severely disabled and dependent on medical technology? If the former, then we would have the bizarre anomaly of a`conscious corpse'; if the latter, then the BD body must equally be an`organism as a whole' despite its severe disability and technological dependence (its unconsciousness being an additional disability, but not one that per se settles the question: is this an unconscious organism or a non-organism?).
From the body's perspective, BD and atropinized high cord transection are virtually indistinguishable (comparing SCI with the subset of BD without diabetes insipidus, or`total' BD with the subset of SCI with pharmacologically controlled diabetes insipidus), because the caudal margin of total brain infarction is in fact a cervico-medullary junction infarction. Thus, regardless how one might choose to de®ne operationally terms such as`integrative unity' or organism as a whole', if they are de®ned carefully enough to apply properly to any ventilator-dependent quadriplegic with diabetes insipidus, then ipso facto they will apply as well to any BD patient.
96
Not only is this conclusion inescapable on theoretical grounds; it is fully rati®ed in clinical experience.
Somatic equivalence in practice
The literatures on intensive care of acute SCI and BD are so similar that they can almost be mutually transformed one into the other merely by interchanging the terms`SCI' and`BD'. Yet this curious fact seems to have passed largely unnoticed, even by authors of respective chapters in the same book (eg, Kofke et al. 35 and MacKenzie and Geisler 45 on the one hand, and Lew and Grenvik 18 on the other).
Induction phase During the process of brain herniation or spinal cord infarction, but prior to BD or complete cord transection, secondary cardiopulmonary pathology (subendocardial microinfarcts, neurogenic pulmonary edema) due to massive sympathetic discharge is common and contributes substantially to the acute hemodynamic instability and early mortality in both BD and SCI. In some cases multiple nonneural organs are also damaged directly by whatever primary etiology damaged the brain or cord. The time course of subsequent relative stabilization, although attributable largely to recovery from spinal shock, also corresponds to resolution and healing of such multisystem complications. That young patients have much greater potential for survival in both conditions also reinforces the idea that the tendency to early demise is attributable more to somatic than to neurologic factors.
It is therefore fallacious to attribute the increased incidence of early arrhythmias and cardiovascular collapse in BD to the absence of brain function per se. (It is also inconsistent, if a parallel attribution is not made for SCI). Rather, the early systemic instabilities are more likely attributable to systemic pathology, antedating the BD as suggested also by Novitzky. 39 If the brain or cord become infarcted in a way that does not overactivate the sympathetic system, cardiopulmonary complications should be much less of a problem (cf 42 ).
Spinal shock The comparison of SCI and BD literatures reveals that every described manifestation of spinal shock also occurs in BD, and conversely, every non-endocrinologic systemic dysfunction characteristic of BD (excluding associated multisystem injury) is explainable in terms of spinal shock. Nevertheless, despite the similarities of somatic symptomatology and the theoretical grounds for equating the somatic pathophysiology of BD with that of cervico-medullary junction transection, a marked explanatory asymmetry has prevailed. The SCI literature attributes a particular set of signs and symptoms to functional suppression of the structurally intact spinal cord below the lesion, below the foramen magnum, and calls it`spinal shock'. By contrast, the BD literature attributes the same set of signs and symptoms directly to destruction of brainstem vegetative control centers above the foramen magnum and calls it`loss of somatic integrative unity'.
For example, depressed sympathetic tone in SCI is usually attributed to deactivation of second-order sympathetic neurons in the intermediolateral cell column, but in BD it is typically attributed to destruction of ®rst-order sympathetic neurons in the hypothalamus and their axons in passage through the medulla (eg, 97 ). But since BD includes cervicomedullary junction infarction, in the context of which the rostral integrity of the sympathetic system is physiologically irrelevant, the most parsimonious explanation of impaired sympathetic tone in BD is spinal shock, just as in SCI. As another example, it is illogical to attribute hypothermia in BD to destruction of hypothalamic thermoregulatory centers (as does Gert 10 ), when the same hypothermia would result from the caudal end of the brain pathology alone (ie, cervico-medullary junction infarction) even if the hypothalamus and medulla were intact, as in SCI.
The same could be said about every other nonendocrinologic somatic dysfunction in BD. This explanatory asymmetry is probably motivated by an a priori conviction that BD ought to be equated with organismal death and SCI not; regardless, it is a logical double standard without physiological basis.
Moreover, because unopposed parasympathetic tone is more disadvantageous hemodynamically than absence of both sympathetic and parasympathetic tone, one could argue that, precisely because vagal function is intact in SCI and often needs to be pharmacologically suppressed, SCI bodies are ironically even less integrated than BD bodies (at least those without diabetes insipidus). Therefore, if despite this disadvantage SCI patients still possess enough integrative unity to quality as living`organisms as a whole', all the more do BD patients.
The similarity of survival curves of the two conditions also argues that high SCI is every bit as somatically`dis-integrating' as BD during the acute phase, yet no one concludes therefore that the bodies of SCI patients are ipso facto`dead' or are mere collections of organs without unity at the level of thè organism as a whole'. Conversely, the somatic instability in BD is potentially every bit as transient as in SCI. If it looks like spinal shock, acts like spinal shock, resolves like spinal shock ± why not call it spinal shock?
Whether the somatic symptomatology of BD is best understood as manifesting`loss of integrative unity' or spinal shock' is answerable through considering the constellation and temporal evolution of clinical signs. The comparison is greatly obscured by the fact that BD patients are typically not supported for the 2 ± 6 weeks necessary to manifest the resolution characteristic of spinal shock. But the case reports of BD patients who have been so maintained 20 indicate that the respective somatic symptomatologies of BD and SCI do in fact closely parallel one another. The parallel is not only qualitative (signs, symptoms) and quantitative (severity, high rate of early asystole) but also temporal (gradual return of autonomous cord function and somatic stabilization) ± unless, of course, the BD patient also sustained diuse spinal cord infarction or injury, a common yet under-appreciated association, especially if the etiology is anoxicischemic.
Endocrinologic dierences Apart from consciousness and the strictly cephalic cranial nerves, the only signi®cant dierence between high SCI and BD is hypothalamic-pituitary function. But hypothalamic dysfunction or nonfunction has never been a diagnostic requirement for BD: neither according to the original Harvard Committee, 46 nor the President's Commission, 6 nor the British Conference of Medical Royal Colleges, 14 nor the Swedish Committee, 5 nor the Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children, 98 nor the myriad other proposers of diagnostic criteria. 99 Diabetes insipidus is absent in 13 ± 62% of BD potential organ donors. 18, 33 Signi®cantly, preservation of such somatically integrative hypothalamic function is declared explicitly compatible with the diagnosis of BD according to the most recent practice parameter of the American Academy of Neurology, 47 even though it contradicts the very de®nition of`whole-brain death'. 100 ± 102 For this subgroup of BD, the somatic physiologic distinction from atropinized high spinal cord transection is virtually nonexistent.
Conclusion
In summary, if the loss of brain-regulation of the body in the one context (SCI) is insucient to constitute cessation of the`organism as a whole', then the same loss of brain-regulation must be equally insucient in the other context (BD). To be sure, total brain destruction is a fatal lesion, but`fatal' in the sense of a strong tendency to bodily death (which can be opposed by medical intervention) rather than per se equalling bodily death. The brain cannot be construed with physiological rigor as the body's`central integrator', in the sense of conferring unity top-down on what would otherwise be a mere collectivity of organs. Neither is any other organ`the central integrator'. A living body possesses not an integrator but integration, a holistic property deriving from the mutual interaction among all the parts. 96 If BD is to be coherently equated with death, death' must therefore be understood in a nonbiological sense, as proponents of`higher-brain' or consciousness formulations have advocated. 1,23 ± 28 Whether society will want to adopt such a concept of death ± which amounts to a notion of the human person as not only conceptually distinct, but actually dissociable, from a living human body ± remains to be seen. That debate exceeds the present scope. What is clear from a somatic pathophysiological comparison with SCI is that the mainstream assertion that BD represents biological death of the human`organism as a whole' is physiologically untenable.
